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Baharin: An R2P Blindspot?
Introduction
While the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been described as having ‘begun to change the 
world’1 the post-intervention turmoil in Libya and the crisis in Syria have cast a shadow over 
its efficacy.2 In this article I argue that the international community’s engagement with 
Bahrain, though generally overlooked, also has a number of implications for assessments of 
the contemporary efficacy of R2P. 
The article starts with a brief overview of the uprising in Bahrain in 2011 and events 
since. It then argues that Bahrain constitutes an “R2P situation”, before examining how key 
actors integral to the implementation of R2P have engaged with crisis. In the final section this 
engagement is analysed and four implications are advanced. The article argues that the 
international engagement with Bahrain demonstrates that the US and UK, as two of the 
permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), continue to prioritise national interests 
over the protection of human rights; that R2P is applied selectively by NGO’s specifically 
focused on the concept; that R2P has not become a “lens” through which intra-state 
humanitarian crises are viewed; and that states can avoid international censure by undertaking 
certain policies which enable them to violate R2P’s principles without incurring significant 
costs. 
The Crisis in Bahrain 2011-2015
Details on the 2011 uprising and the situation since are contested; to minimise bias, the 
following narrative is based on the analysis provided by international NGO’s, UN agencies 
and, in particular the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report.3 
The 2011 Uprising
In early 2011 a Facebook page called “February 14th Revolution in Bahrain” called for mass 
protests on the 14th February. Despite the deployment of the Bahraini police, protests were 
held across the country; BICI noted they focused on ‘political grievances and…socio-
economic demands’ and involved ‘a large degree of popular support that crossed religious, 
sectarian and ethnic lines’.4 By the 16th February some 12,000 people had gathered at the 
Pearl Roundabout in the capital Manama in a ‘festive’ mood.5 In the early hours of the 17th 
over 1,000 armed police cleared protesters from the roundabout; three people were killed by 
the police as some resisted. This sparked an escalation in tension as opposition parties – the 
most vocal being Al Wefaq – and civil society organisations condemned the security 
service’s heavy-handed tactics and called for more popular participation. The funerals of 
those killed became rallies for the opposition and by the 19th February the protestors had 
regained control of the Pearl Roundabout, where some 15,000 protestors gathered in 
‘celebratory’ mood.6 At this stage the Crown Price accepted that the protestors constituted ‘a 
very significant proportion of our society’.7 
On the 20th February some 80-85% of employees in Bahrain took part in a nation-
wide strike.8 By the 26th the demands of the protestors – which now included large numbers 
of university students and staff – had hardened and the Monarchy’s offers of reform were 
rejected in favour of the chant, “The people demand the removal of the regime” which had 
become the rallying cry of protestors across the region. BICI found that this change in 
demands was not accompanied, however, by a change in tactics and ‘the protestors remained 
peaceful’.9 The main opposition group Al Wefaq repeatedly called for the protests to remain 
non-sectarian and peaceful.10 In early March negotiations between protesters and the 
government faltered on the issue of the role of the Monarchy. During this period various 
armed groups – described as “vigilantes” by the US Ambassador to Bahrain11  – began to 
target both Sunni and Shia’s and sectarian tensions rose. 
On the evening of the 14th March the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Jazeera Shield 
Forces entered Bahrain. According to the Force Commander the aim was, ‘…to help the 
government to bring goodness, peace, and love to Bahrain’.12 The decision was also justified 
on the on grounds that Bahrain needed support against “external threats” meaning Iran, but 
fears about Bahrain precipitating a ‘snowballing effect from Bahrain into other GCC 
members’ were also to the fore.13 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated that he viewed 
the intervention ‘with concern’.14 Following the arrival of the GCC Jazeera Shield Forces, Al 
Wefaq issued a statement describing the intervention as, ‘…a sign that the governing 
authority of Bahrain considers itself to have lost all legitimacy’.15 On the 15th March King 
Hamad passed Royal Decree No. 18 which declared a “State of National Safety” for three 
months. According to BICI this, ‘opened the door for the perpetration of grave violations of 
human rights, including the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and arbitrary detention’.16 
On the 16th March the government sent 5,000 personnel to clear protestors from the 
Pearl Roundabout; according to BICI the force used was ‘unnecessary and disproportionate’17 
and the security services engaged in ‘terror-inspiring behaviour and unnecessary damage to 
property’.18 The International Crisis Group (ICG) described the government’s response as 
‘brutal repression’.19
Later that day a curfew was declared and all demonstrations were banned. The 17th 
witnessed mass arrests described by BICI as often undertaken in a purposely ‘terrorising 
manner’.20 Checkpoints were established throughout Bahrain at which Shia were often 
‘verbally abused because of their religious and sectarian beliefs’.21 From the 1st March to the 
end of April Shia religious buildings, including 28 mosques, were demolished. According to 
BICI this was viewed by the Shia community as ‘a collective punishment’ that served to 
‘inflame the tension between the GoB and the Shia population’. 22 Likewise the ICG 
described the government’s repression as sectarian23 and a report in the New York Times 
accused state-owned media of stoking anti-Shia sentiments.24
Following the crack-down, the National Security Agency and Ministry of the Interior 
engaged in ‘a systematic practice of physical and psychological mistreatment, which in many 
cases amounted to torture’.25 According to BICI, detainees ‘…were subjected to various 
forms of mistreatment, including beatings, kicking, lashing with rubber hoses and verbal 
insults’.26 BICI noted, ‘these measures fall within the meaning of torture as defined in the 
Convention Against Torture’.27 BICI found that between 14 February and 14 April 35 people 
died; five were tortured to death.28 The report noted that torture had long been central to the 
Bahrain security apparatus and stated that torture was ‘a systemic problem’.29 The European 
Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights also argued that the torture perpetrated by the 
Bahraini authorities constituted ‘an overall pattern of crimes that might constitute crimes 
against humanity’.30 The manner in which the Bahrain government and security forces 
responded was ultimately summarised by BICI as ‘unnecessary, disproportionate, and 
indiscriminate’.31 
Post-2011 Reform?
The situation became less volatile after April 2011; BICI was established by the King in June 
2011 and released its report in November that year which, in addition to providing a 
comprehensive narrative of the crisis, advanced recommendations on political and judicial 
reform.32 In the intervening period, however, progress on implementing the recommendations 
has been slow and systemic human rights abuses continue. Indicatively the UK’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee (FAC) wrote, ‘In our view the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry made sensible recommendations and the Bahrain government's failure to implement 
them fully is inexplicable’.33 The FAC report also expressed concerns about ‘a number of 
regressive policies’ implemented since 2011 such as the banning of street protests, revoking 
the nationality of opposition activists, banning opposition groups from meeting foreign 
officials without the government’s permission and a member of the government present, the 
lack of judicial independence, and ‘serious concerns about due process’.34 
Since the 2011 uprising many human rights organisations, think tanks, UN bodies and 
government organs have issued highly critical statements and reports on the Bahraini 
government’s continued violation of basic human rights and systemic use of torture. In 
August 2012 44 international NGO’s signed a letter condemning Bahrain’s suppression of 
political opposition and the curtailment of human rights.35 In January 2013 the UN Human 
Rights Council condemned ‘the continued harassment and imprisonment of persons 
exercising their rights to freedom of opinion and expression in Bahrain’.36 A report by 
Human Rights Watch in February 2013 declared that there had been ‘no progress on key 
reform promises’ stating that the governments promises on reform ‘mean nothing’.37 The UK 
FAC 2013 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy likewise concluded ‘we see little 
or no evidence that Bahrain has made enough progress in implementing political reform and 
safeguarding human rights’.38 In April 2013 the Bahrain government cancelled a visit by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, the second time that the Rapporteur had been denied 
entry since 2011. In February 2014 the International Federation for Human Rights stated, 
‘Bahraini authorities continue to fail in their promises of implementing the BICI 
recommendations’.39 In July 2014 Tom Malinowski, US Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, was expelled from the country after he met with 
leaders of the opposition.40 The UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention ruled in July 2014, ‘Bahrain in violation of its international human rights 
obligations’.41 In June 2014 47 countries issued a joint statement at the UN Human Rights 
Council’s 26th Session which described the human rights situation in Bahrain as ‘an issue of 
serious concern’ noting ‘the lack of guarantee of fair trial’, ‘the repression of 
demonstrations’, ‘the continued harassment and imprisonment of persons exercising their 
rights to freedom of opinion’ and ‘ill-treatment and torture in detention facilities’.42 An article 
in Foreign Policy in March 2015 affirmed that violations were still occurring, noting 
‘allegations of the use of torture, sexual abuse and forced confessions were again 
commonplace’.43
HRW’s 2013 country report on Bahrain noted ‘the government failed to fully 
implement the commission’s core recommendations’, and that the ‘Security forces used 
excessive force in 2012 to disperse anti-government protests’.44 Its 2014 report stated 
‘Bahrain’s human rights record regressed further’, highlighted, ‘Continuing reports of torture 
and ill-treatment in detention’ and again condemned, ‘The government’s failure to implement 
key recommendations of the BICI’.45 HRW’s 2015 report likewise listed a series of 
indictments of the Monarchy noting, ‘…the justice system has failed to hold members of the 
security forces accountable for serious rights violations, including in cases where their use of 
excessive and unlawful force proved fatal’ and the ‘…failure to address the security forces 
use of lethal and apparently disproportionate force’. The report also notes that Bahraini 
government has jailed opposition leaders on ‘vague terrorism charges’, curtailed freedom of 
expression, facilitated the ‘physical abuse and forced labour’ of migrant workers, and passed 
a new law giving the Interior Ministry the power to revoke the citizenship of any Bahraini 
who ‘causes harm to the interests of the Kingdom or acts in a way that contravenes his duty 
of loyalty to it’.46
A March 2015 report by Reporters Without Borders condemned the ‘…systematic 
persecution of journalists and human right defenders and the renewed deterioration in the 
climate for freedom of information in Bahrain’.47 A 2015 review of press freedom globally 
found Bahrain to be 163rd out of 180.48 Freedom House’s 2015 report likewise recorded a 
sharp decline in freedom within Bahrain since 2011 giving the country a score of 6.5 (7 being 
the lowest possible).49 In 2013 The Genocide Prevention Advisory Network ranked Bahrain 
second in the list of “Countries with High Risks of Genocide and Politicide if they should 
have Major Conflicts or State Failures” noting a ‘sharp increase after 2010’ in the column 
“Recent Changes and Hazards”.50 The organisation’s most recent “Countries at Risk of 
Genocide, Politicide, or Mass Atrocities” also listed Bahrain.51 In 2014 Cherif Bassouni, 
Chair of BICI, noted the Bahraini government’s implementation of his recommendations had 
been ‘piecemeal’ and warned that people ‘who do not have the hope of seeing themselves as 
equal citizens’ eventually ‘explode’. He stated that unrest is ‘bound to continue to increase 
unless we address the social and economic reasons’.52
Amnesty International’s 2014/15 country report on Bahrain notes, ‘The security 
forces regularly used excessive force’ listing various methods employed including, ‘severe 
beating, punching, electric shocks, suspension by the limbs, rape and threats of rape, and 
deliberate exposure to extreme cold’.53 This echoes two other reports published by Amnesty 
International in 2015; the first condemns ‘…the rampant abuses including torture, arbitrary 
detentions and excessive use of force against peaceful activists and government critics, which 
continue to take place in Bahrain four years after the uprisings’, and with respects to the BICI 
recommendations states ‘most of these measures have had little impact in practice’.54 The 
second report published in April 2015 is more ominous; it finds ‘Bahrain, today, continues to 
go through a political and human rights crisis’, hopes for reform have ‘all but evaporated’, 
‘tension within the Kingdom remains critically high’ and ‘Bahrain is more deeply divided 
than ever’.55 
An R2P Situation? 
R2P is about much more than coercive military intervention; such action is invariably 
presented as an option of last resort within R2P.56 In his 2009 report, UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon outlined three “Pillars” of R2P; Pillar I: ‘…the enduring responsibility of the 
State to protect its populations’; Pilar II: ‘…the commitment of the international community 
to assist States in meeting those obligations; Pillar III: ‘…the responsibility of Member States 
to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to 
provide such protection’.57 Thus, the applicability of R2P – and the means by which it can be 
operationalised – extends far beyond just reacting, through non-consensual military 
intervention, to actual cases where the “four crimes” are occurring. 
R2P advocates have, indeed, continually sought to distance the concept from coercive 
military intervention and present it as primarily a means to prevent the occurrence of the 
“four crimes” by working with the state in question through Pillar I and Pillar II.58 UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued that the ‘the ultimate purpose of the responsibility to 
protect [is] to save lives by preventing the most egregious mass violations of human rights’.59 
Likewise Alex Bellamy, Director of the Asia Pacific Centre on R2P stated, ‘R2P has real 
value precisely because it has the potential to improve the prevention of mass atrocities and 
protection of vulnerable populations’.60 The 2014 crisis in Gaza led to a debate about R2P’s 
applicability; in response to claims that R2P did not apply in Gaza, Bellamy stated, 
There should be no question about whether R2P “applies” or not. In fact, posing that 
very question mistakes what states agreed about R2P in 2005. R2P is not conditional. 
It does not arise or evaporate with circumstance. It is universal and enduring; it 
applies everywhere, all the time.61 
An “R2P situation” does not, therefore, only mean one that meets a threshold for military 
intervention or even a case where one or more of the four crimes has occurred.
This applicability beyond reacting to actual cases of the “four crimes”  is reflected in 
the wording of Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document; 
Paragraph 138 reads, ‘This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including 
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means’, while Paragraph 138 commits 
the international community, ‘to helping States build capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out’. Within the remit of 
prevention there are myriad issues deemed to be within R2P’s purview on the basis that they 
are potential catalysts for the outbreak of one or more of the four crimes.62 Ban Ki-Moon’s 
prescriptions on the Responsibility to Prevent in 2013 focused on the need to ‘build societies 
that are resilient to atrocity crimes’ by leveraging R2P long before atrocities are committed; 
he stated,
Building resilience implies developing appropriate legal frameworks and building 
State structures and institutions that are legitimate, respect international human rights 
law and the rule of law in general, and that have the capacity to address and defuse 
sources of tension before they escalate. It means building a society which accepts and 
values diversity and in which different communities coexist peacefully.63 
In 2014 The Joint Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect (OSAPGR2P) published the “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 
Crimes: A Tool for Prevention”. This was described by the UN Secretary General as ‘a guide 
for assessing the risk of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ which places, 
‘the prevention of atrocity crimes at the centre of our work’.64 The report notes, ‘Atrocity 
crimes tend to occur in countries with some level of instability or crisis’ and advises states to 
use this framework to address the root causes of tension and conflict.65  
Does Bahrain Warrant Attention?
The number of fatalities during the 2011 uprising was not very high in relative terms66 but 
this excuse was explicitly rejected by HRW; criticising the international community for 
‘averting their eyes’ during the government crack-down, they stated that the number of 
people killed in less than two months in 2011 was ‘substantial and greater than the casualties 
resulting from five years of protracted unrest in the 1990s’.67 Thus, while the number of the 
fatalities was certainly less than other crises, this overlooks the sudden spike in fatalities and 
Bahrain’s small population. 
Looking at the crises specifically with respects to R2P’s “4 crimes”, again the 
evidence suggests that, in relative terms, the 2011 uprising and its aftermath were not 
characterised by the egregious commission of these crimes. There is no evidence of genocide 
having been either planned or undertaken in Bahrain; if one adopts a circumscribed definition 
of “war crimes” as being reserved for criminal acts undertaken during international armed 
conflict then again this is not applicable to Bahrain68; while the government’s response to the 
uprising has been marked by sectarianism, heavy-handed tactics against predominantly Shia 
villages and the destruction of Shia mosques, it is difficult to argue that ethnic cleansing has 
been evident. Crimes against humanity, however, appear to have been perpetrated both 
during and since the uprising. Article 7 of the Rome Statute lists torture as a crime against 
humanity, a point made by the OSAPGR2P in its framework for analysis.69 In addition to 
systemic torture there has also been evidence of ‘murder’, ‘deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law’, ‘persecution against any identifiable 
group’ and ‘intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health’ which are all covered under Article 7 of the Rome Statute  if ‘committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’. BICI did find that torture at least, was indeed ‘systemic’.70 
Even if it is the case that crimes against humanity haven’t been committed – which 
contradicts the evidence supplied by reputable human rights NGOs like Amnesty, HRW and 
the ICG – or were committed on a relatively small scale, this does not mean Bahrain is not an 
“R2P situation”. As detailed in previous sections, it is incontrovertible that systemic state-
sponsored human rights violations occurred during the March 2011 uprising and since; that 
Bahrain is experiencing sectarian tension exacerbated by what some have alleged to be state-
orchestrated persecution of Shias71; that the political and judicial system do not conform to 
normative standards; and, most worryingly that the situation at present is deteriorating, 
described by some as a “crisis” with tensions ‘critically high’72 that threaten to ‘explode’.73   
The OSAPGR2P’s 2014 report – described by Ban Ki-Moon as a means through 
which to implement the preventative element of R2P74 – lists 14 ‘risk factors’ which are 
presented as a means to ‘guide an assessment of whether a particular State faces the kind of 
stress that could generate an environment conducive to atrocity crimes’.75 Of the 14 “Risk 
Factors” listed 8 appear, on the basis of the evidence detailed earlier, to be manifest in 
Bahrain either during the 2011 uprising or in the period since; these are, “Situations of armed 
conflict or other forms of instability”; “Record of serious violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law”; “Motives or incentives”; “Capacity to commit atrocity crimes”; 
“Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups”; “Signs of an 
intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group”; “Signs of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population”; “Serious threats to those protected under international 
humanitarian law”. 76  Collectively this constitutes definitive grounds for deeming Bahrain, 
both in 2011 and since, to be a definite “R2P situation” especially when taken in tandem with 
the various ominous warnings about the situation deteriorating of late. 
Where is R2P?
Since 2011 Bahrain has witnessed ‘brutal repression’77 by the government against pro-
democracy protestors, ‘systemic torture’78, external military intervention, state-sponsored 
sectarianism79, and institutionalised corruption within the judiciary80; in the past four years 
the situation has steady deteriorated to the point where many have issued warnings that the 
situation could soon explode into open conflict again; indicatively the ICG warned that the 
government’s tactics were ‘Laying the groundwork for a potential future uprising. In this 
tense atmosphere, any further provocation or violent action could trigger an explosion’.81
Yet, despite the evidence presented by various human rights NGOs, states, UN bodies and 
BICI, the application of R2P to Bahrain has been minimal. The following sub-sections assess 
the manner in which three actors/groups central to the operationalisation of R2P have 
responded to the crisis in Bahrain. 
The Security Council’s Response
The Security Council was established long before R2P but it is central to the application of 
the concept; the efficacy of R2P is, to a large extent, dependent on the Security Council’s 
willingness to invoke and act upon the concept.82 Some have argued that as R2P has not 
initiated, or called for, structural reforms of the UN, it has facilitated the perpetuation of the 
Security Council’s, and specifically the P5’s, powers which has meant that narrow national 
interests continue to impede the enforcement of human rights.83 In response, however, many 
R2P advocates have argued that the Security Council’s disposition towards R2P has 
improved dramatically in the past five years. This has manifest, supporters claim, in the 
upsurge in Security Council Resolutions which mention R2P, the use of R2P and associated 
terms in Security Council debates, the unwillingness of any Security Council member to 
disavow R2P, and most emphatically, Security Council Resolution 1973 which sanctioned 
the use of force against Gadhafi’s Libya in March 2011.84 
Yet, while expressions of optimism about the Security Council’s recent ostensible 
embrace of R2P, and the principles it embodies, are increasingly common, the Security 
Council’s response to Bahrain has been negligible; no Security Council Resolution or 
Presidential Statement has ever mentioned Bahrain since the crisis began. 
The Secretary General’s Response
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has been a particularly vocal proponent of R2P which 
he described as ‘a core part of the world’s armour for protecting vulnerable populations from 
the most serious international crimes and violations’.85 In his 2012 report on R2P Ban Ki-
Moon reaffirmed the need to see R2P as a means to prevent atrocity crimes by tackling root-
cause issues such as ‘discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, stigmatization, 
dehumanization and denial of fundamental human rights’.86 Each of these have been evident 
in Bahrain since 2011. 
Since the crisis in Bahrain began Ban Ki-Moon has issued 15 statements specifically 
on Bahrain.87 The statements have consistently reiterated certain themes namely, the need for 
a peaceful resolution of the crisis88, calls for the full implementation of the BICI 
recommendations89, the right to protest90, judicial independence91, and adherence to 
international humanitarian law.92 In none of these statements on Bahrain, however, did the 
Secretary General mention R2P. Additionally, since 2009 he has issued six annual reports on 
R2P, none of which refer to Bahrain.93 
The Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to 
Protect
In October 2014 OSAPGR2P published the “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes” 
which emphasised the need for pro-active preventative action to mitigate the deleterious 
effects of societal tension which could lead to the commission of atrocity crimes. The report 
outlined 18 “Risk Factors” each with a set of on average 8 “Indicators”; the evidence 
presented suggests that the situation in Bahrain meets at least 8 of these “Risk Factors” and 
many more of their associated “Indicators”. In particular the report warns that atrocity crimes 
invariably stem from discriminatory practices and societal fissures; given the reports of 
‘systematic sectarian discrimination’94 and ‘sectarian turmoil’95 within Bahrain, and the fact 
that violence already broke out in 2011, the situation appears to be an archetypal situation of 
concern. 
Despite this, to date OSAPGR2P has not engaged with Bahrain. The Special Advisers 
have not visited the country; their website lists all the 42 official statements made by both 
Special Advisers to date, none of which mention Bahrain; the website also lists 9 “Country 
Situations” but Bahrain is not listed.96
The NGO Response
The role of NGO’s is central to the promotion of R2P, and indeed a key part of the strategy 
underpinning its normative role.97 The following analysis focuses on the three most 
prominent NGO’s singularly focused on R2P namely The Global Centre for R2P (GCR2P), 
the International Coalition for RtoP (ICRtoP) and The Asia Pacific Centre for R2P 
(APCR2P). Building on the presumption that ‘global civil society’ has an influence on state 
behaviour, these R2P-orientated NGOs seek to promote the concept and highlight the plight 
of people across the globe at risk from, or suffering, one or more of the four crimes.98 
Asked about the GCR2P’s engagement with Bahrain, Ryan D’Souza – GCR2P’s 
Advocacy officer – responded, ‘We don't have any publications on Bahrain but we did 
carefully monitor the situation at the time of the instability in Bahrain’.99 Since January 2012 
GCR2P has published the “R2P Monitor” bi-monthly, describing it as ‘applying an R2P lens 
to situations where populations are at risk of, or are currently facing, mass atrocity crimes’.100 
None of the 21 editions published have mentioned Bahrain. The GCR2P’s website also hosts 
a “Populations at Risk” section with the countries listed divided into groups; “Current 
Crises”, “Imminent Risk”, “Serious Concern”, and “Previously Studied Situations”. Bahrain 
is not one of the 23 countries listed. 101 The GCR2P publishes an “Occasional Paper Series” 
which has focused on a number of intra-state conflicts, but never Bahrain.102 There is 
additionally no record of the GCR2P having ever issued a statement on Bahrain. The GCR2P 
has never published their own tweet or Facebook post on the situation. The GCR2P also 
retweets/reposts links from other NGO’s and the international media on a wide variety of 
issues; since the uprising in Bahrain began the GCR2P has mentioned Bahrain in just one 
tweet103 and two Facebook posts.104 
Bahrain is not listed by the ICRtoP on its “Crises” page. When asked about its 
coverage of Bahrain, ICRtoP responded ‘We have not published anything directly on 
Bahrain…we have not tweeted or posted on Bahrain’.105 The ICRtoP has actually published 
one tweet106 on Bahrain and one Facebook post107 both of which referred to reports by others. 
Since 2011 the APCR2P has published “R2P Ideas in Brief” short articles on 
‘important issues of R2P concern’.108 None of the 28 articles focus on Bahrain, nor do any of 
the Centre’s 9 “Newsletters” published to date.109 The Centre’s list of its staff’s publications 
since 2011 does not include anything on Bahrain110 and its academic journal Global 
Responsibility to Protect has never published an article on Bahrain.111 The APCR2P has 
never mentioned Bahrain on twitter but it has published seven Facebook posts.112 
Other less prominent R2P-orientated organisations evidence similar trends. The 
Canadian Centre for R2P, the Montreal Institute for Genocide Prevention and the Will to 
Intervene Project have never published anything on Bahrain; collectively they have published 
two tweets on Bahrain.113 
Collectively, since 2011, the GCR2P, the ICRtoP, the APCR2P, the Canadian Centre 
for R2P, the Montreal Institute for Genocide Prevention and the Will to Intervene Project 
have published three tweets and eight Facebook posts about Bahrain. Since the GCR2P 
joined twitter in September 2011 it has issued a total of 8,600 tweets, an average of over 200 
per month; since the ICRtoP joined twitter in April 2011 it has issued 12,500 tweets, an 
average of 250 a month. Thousands of these tweets constitute the organisation’s retweeting 
reports and statements from other NGOs on a huge array of issues; from April to June 2015 
alone, the GCR2P and the ICRtoP have retweeted on issues such as the destruction of 
UNESCO World Heritage Sites114, the rehabilitation of Child Soldiers115 Resolutions on 
small arms trade116, the election campaign for a new UN Secretary General117, a conference 
on women’s role in peacebuilding118, “Earth Day”119, and North Korea’s non-compliance 
with the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.120 Given that combined they have issued over 21,000 
tweets since April 2011 on an eclectic array of issues, it is remarkable that they have only 
mentioned Bahrain once. The APCR2P is primarily focuses on a region which does not 
include Bahrain, yet, it has published tweets on a number of issues related to areas outside 
this region such as policing in Sudan121, the crisis in Burundi122, and the conflict in Syria.123 
While Bahrain has not been at the very top of the international political agenda, and 
the crisis is certainly not as grave as elsewhere, it has been regularly commented on by high-
profile human rights NGOs such as HRW and Amnesty International, as well as newspapers 
such as The New York Times, The Guardian, Le Monde and many others; to have consistently 
neglected to even refer to these reports and articles via twitter and Facebook is clearly 
noteworthy.  
Assessing the Bahrain Blind Spot
The situation in Bahrain both during the 2011 uprising and since, appears to clearly warrant 
more attention than it has achieved, particularly from those closely connected with promoting 
and implementing R2P. The demonstrably paltry coverage outlined above has four 
implications for assessments of the contemporary efficacy of R2P. 
Security Council Mendacity
In looking for explanations for the complete absence of any references to Bahrain at the 
Security Council since 2011 it is perhaps obvious that geopolitics has played a significant 
role; both the US and the UK are allies of Bahrain. In 1995 the US chose Bahrain as the base 
for its Naval Fifth Fleet and in 2002 the US declared Bahrain to be ‘a major non-NATO 
ally’.124 Since the 2011 uprising the US has continued to sell millions of dollars’ worth of 
arms to the Monarchy; though it initially put restrictions on the sale of certain weapons, it has 
begun to repeal these and recently increased the size of its naval fleet based there.125 
Justifying the resumption of arms sales to Bahrain, the US State Department acknowledged 
that the human rights situation in Bahrain was not ‘adequate’ but spokesman John Kirby 
argued, ‘Bahrain is an important and longstanding ally’.126 The UK-Bahrain relationship was 
described by the Royal United Services Institute as ‘crucial to the UK’s pursuit of its national 
strategic aims’127 and the UK FAC noted that ‘Bahrain provides an immensely valuable home 
in the Gulf for UK naval assets which would be difficult to find elsewhere’.128 To this end, 
the UK announced in 2014 that it was starting construction on a new £15 million naval base 
in Bahrain.129  
Given their close ties, the US and UK are perhaps understandably reluctant to publicly 
rebuke Bahrain through either a Security Council Resolution or a Presidential Statement. This 
has obviously troubling implications for R2P; the manner in which both countries have 
shielded their ally from censure130, and indeed continued to provide the Monarchy with arms 
and investment, suggests that these democracies, both of whom have historically been 
rhetorically supportive of R2P, continue to pursue foreign policy strategies which at times 
relegate human rights to a secondary position behind narrowly conceived national interests. 
Given that R2P is, to a great extent, dependent on the P5’s support for its practical 
application, the persistence of this disposition will naturally inhibit the realisation of R2P 
across all three Pillars and lead to its politicised application. 
The Selective Application of R2P
R2P ostensibly ‘applies everywhere, all the time’131; the coverage of Bahrain by R2P-
orientated NGOs, however, appears to contradict this as these NGOs have been virtually 
silent on Bahrain. It is impossible to believe that these organisations were ignorant of the 
situation in Bahrain or indeed the myriad reports by NGO’s on this situation; indeed both 
HRW and the ICG are members of the ICRtoP.  It is potentially conceivable that these 
organisations did not recognise the applicability of R2P to Bahrain. While this strains 
credulity, even if this was the case, it contradicts the “R2P applies everywhere” narrative; if 
these organisations specifically focused on R2P don’t recognise an “R2P situation” then what 
hope is there that other actors, especially states, will? 
The final, more troubling explanation relates to a long-standing critique of R2P, and 
indeed human rights-orientated NGOs generally, namely that both serve “Western” 
interests.132 There is an obvious link between Western state interests – especially from the 
UK and the US – and the monarchy in Bahrain, and indeed its major ally Saudi Arabia. It 
could conceivably be argued, therefore, that the R2P NGOs have not focused on Bahrain 
because they have, covertly or otherwise, been encouraged to refrain from embarrassing a 
Western ally; this charge has been made previously with respects to the lack of R2P coverage 
of Israel by these NGOs.133 The APCR2P is primarily funded by the Australian government, 
while the ICRtoP and the GCR2P are both based in New York. The GCR2P lists those who 
have provided it with ‘generous financial support’; there are 15 governments, only two of 
which are not European or North American (Mexico and Rwanda),  seven foundations, all of 
which are US-based, and three individuals, all of whom are US-based. This does not 
necessarily mean this organisation is controlled by Western interests of course, but in tandem 
with the selective application of its “R2P lens”, could be interpreted as supporting the charge 
that R2P is applied frequently in accord with Western interests and perspectives. Whether this 
is true or not, such perceptions naturally inhibit the efficacy both of R2P and these NGOs. 
R2P was lauded as a value-neutral substitute for “humanitarian intervention” which was 
deemed to be too closely associated with Western interests134; the selective application of 
R2P, particularly with respects to an obvious ally of the West, will naturally undermine the 
concept’s popularity.   
The “R2P Lens”
A key element of the strategy underpinning R2P is to develop an “R2P lens” through which 
intra-state unrest is viewed.135 In his 2010 report on prevention and R2P Ban Ki-Moon 
advocated this stating, ‘the existing mechanisms for gathering and analysing information for 
the purpose of early warning do not view that information through the lens of the 
responsibility to protect’.136 The “R2P lens” appears to have been ineffective in the course of 
the crisis in Bahrain; since 2011 R2P-orientated NGOs and the OSAPGR2P have, essentially 
ignored the situation and additionally, those organisations that have sought to highlight both 
the ongoing systemic human rights abuses and the potential for the situation to explode into 
mass conflict, have not employed R2P in so doing. Those that have focused on Bahrain, such 
as the ICG, Amnesty International, HRW and indeed the UN Secretary General, have never 
mentioned R2P in any of their reports or statements. Illustrative of the absence of a link 
between the humanitarian crisis and R2P is the fact that only one human rights organisation 
has ever mentioned R2P and Bahrain in the same tweet.137 This suggests that R2P has not 
become a “lens” through which human rights violations are viewed.
How to Oppress with Impunity?
The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights claimed that the lack of any international 
condemnation of the 16th March 2011 crackdown emboldened the Khalifa Monarchy to 
commit further atrocities. In the years since, they note, ‘the authorities in Bahrain, due to the 
lack of international consequences, have no incentive to stop the human rights violations’.138 
Thus, Bahrain potentially provides insight into how governments can engage in, and get away 
with, oppression against their own people in the post-R2P era. 
The government has managed to avoid international censure of the type meted out to 
other oppressive regimes such as Libya, Syria, Myanmar and Burundi through a combination 
of factors. First, as noted earlier, Bahrain has cultivated a series of alliances with key 
international actors, most notably Saudi Arabia139, the UK and the US. These states have 
shielded Bahrain from international censure at important international fora – such as the 
Security Council – and raised the political costs for others tempted to criticize them. Second, 
Bahrain has engaged with the international community in ways which have made 
condemnation of its internal policies unattractive to those with important investments – 
political, economic and reputational – in the country, a point openly acknowledged by the UK 
FCO report.140 Bahrain is a key venue for international investments, an important oil exporter 
and has major investments in the US and the UK; a report by The Financial Times found that 
Premier Group, an investment firm run by the Monarchy, has investments worth £900 million 
in the UK alone.141 The Monarchy, though religiously conservative, has also sought to open 
the country up to tourism and international sport; illustratively, the “Bahrain Grand Prix” has 
taken place annually since 2004. As a result a number of non-political international figures 
have a vested interest in cultivating a benign image of Bahrain; Formula 1 chief executive 
Bernie Ecclestone, for example, has resisted calls to boycott the country due to the human 
rights violations, describing protestors as simply ‘lot of kids having a go at the police’.142 
Third, the monarchy established BICI which enabled it to do two things; first, present itself as 
progressive and open, and second, advance a narrative since that it was instituting reforms.143 
This later point, indeed, has been a common refrain issued when criticism has flared and has 
often been echoed by both the US and UK when justifying their continued support for the 
Monarchy.144 Yet, this has been rejected by others as disingenuous; indicatively Kenneth 
Roth stated that those who argue that Bahrain’s human rights record has improved are living 
‘in a dream world’.145
Finally, the monarchy has expressed its fulsome support for R2P thereby sidestepping 
any criticism for antipathy to the concept, such as has been directed at Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
Sudan and Cuba.146 In September 2012, describing itself as ‘a country responsive to its 
international responsibilities’, the Bahraini ambassador stated in the General Assembly; 
Our organisation must therefore shoulder its responsibilities for the protection of 
unarmed civilians and must not allow the procedures for the United Nations to impede 
its ability to prevent crimes against humanity. It must put aside the narrow 
geopolitical interests and proceed to the attainment of the supreme goal which is the 
responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts.147 
This recognition that “the responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts” is “the 
supreme goal” contrasts sharply with the myriad reports published since 2011 discussed 
above which charge Bahrain with systemic human rights abuses, the use of excessive force 
and violent sectarianism. It is also potentially significant that at the 2009 General Assembly 
debate on R2P Bahrain was one of the few states not to issue a statement on R2P; it was only 
after the 2011 uprising that Bahrain expressed its support for the concept. To derive benefits 
from rhetorically supporting R2P whilst systemically acting against its ethos clearly has 
ominous implications for the utility of R2P. 
 
Conclusion
The 2011 response by the Bahrain government was described by HRW as a ‘systematic and 
comprehensive crackdown to punish and intimidate government critics and to end dissent 
root and branch’.148 Yet, the international response – from the Security Council, the 
OSAPGR2P and R2P-orientated NGOs – at the time was negligible.149  
Since 2011 Bahrain has witnessed repeated systemic human rights violations and 
exhibited numerous signs of looming calamity; given the sectarian nature of the conflict, the 
persistent simmering violence, the government’s repressive tactics, the failure to implement 
the BICI reforms and the fact that external forces have already militarily intervened – the 
GCC force in 2011 – and others – most notably Iran – are alleged to be stoking internal 
dissent, Bahrain exhibits many obvious warning signs. Yet, whilst this has been regularly 
highlighted by the international media and reputable human rights organisations, the response 
from those most closely associated with R2P has continued to be paltry. 
R2P is presented as a framework for preventing conflicts by helping states to address 
sources of tension domestically – as well as a reactive means to halt the occurrence of one or 
more of the “four crimes”. According to Bellamy, ‘R2P provides a commonly understood 
political framework which actors and institutions of all shapes and sizes, ranging from 
individuals to global organizations and superpower states can utilize, individually or 
collectively’.150 In the case of Bahrain, this normative role for R2P has not materialised and 
this has troubling implications for the future efficacy of R2P.
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